USA Rare Earth said on November 9, 2026 that its Brazilian subsidiary Serra Verde had begun commercial-scale shipments of mixed rare earth carbonate from the Pela Ema mine in Goiás, after shipments started in October. The buyer is US SIIE, LLC, a special purpose vehicle capitalised by the US government. The deal runs 15 years, covers 100% of Phase I output on a take-or-pay basis, and sets floor prices of $110/kg for neodymium and praseodymium, $575/kg for dysprosium and $2,050/kg for terbium. USA Rare Earth began receiving payments in November, and its shares rose 10.8% to $8.78, valuing the company at $3.1 billion.

Expressionist painting: laborers haul baskets of raw ore up a quarry ramp toward a smoldering furnace, while a gleaming citadel of finished blades sits unreachable on a hilltop.

The floors are a policy price, not a market price. The 70% upside share is measured against a non-China reference that exists because Washington is paying for it.

The deal is a put option written by the Pentagon

Baroque painting: a lone figure holds a large black umbrella over a huddled crowd of merchants as dark floodwater climbs the marble steps of a government hall.

Structurally, the SPV buys all of Phase I production for 15 years at a guaranteed minimum. If prices rise above the floor, USA Rare Earth receives 70% of the difference between European and US reference prices and the floor, less a fixed separation cost. If the reference price falls, the floor still pays. The government carries the downside, and the company keeps most of the upside. Its equity holders sit in the middle. The stock rose on the announcement as if the floor were a gift, but someone pays for it, and the structure says the government does.

How the machine fits together

The SPV, US SIIE, put its capitalisation arrangements in place effective August 24, 2026, and was then required to begin accepting deliveries, which the company expected early in the fourth quarter. The Northern Miner reported that the Pentagon provided $750 million to capitalise the buyer, citing an August company filing. Serra Verde's own August announcement said the government had substantially increased its funding of the SPV to $750 million, confirmed $300 million in forward purchase contracts, and signed a commitment letter for a further $500 million under a debt facility. Separately, Serra Verde has a previously announced $565 million financing package from the US International Development Finance Corporation.

The product is an intermediate, not a finished oxide. The material is mixed rare earth carbonate. It contains neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium, along with yttrium and other heavy rare earths, and it meets the customer's quality acceptance specifications. The dysprosium and terbium still have to be separated before they can go into magnets, and USA Rare Earth earns revenue from the heavy rare earths, including yttrium, only after that separation.

The timing follows Beijing's hand. China's April 2025 licensing regime covering seven medium and heavy rare earths, including dysprosium and terbium, remains in force. Its October 2025 controls were suspended, and on November 9 Beijing extended that suspension to January 10, 2027, one day before it was due to lapse. Washington is now acting as buyer, lender and shareholder in critical minerals through Project Vault, equity stakes, price floors and stockpiling. The price-floor offtake is the newest tool in that set.

Dy at $4,100/kg against a $575/kg floor

The premium is real, and it is a policy artifact. The company cites non-China dysprosium oxide at 14 to 16 times Chinese levels and terbium at 6 to 9 times. Platts assessed dysprosium oxide delivered to North America at $4,100/kg on October 30, against a $1,200/kg launch price on March 31. At that level, the $575/kg dysprosium floor sits far below the current non-China reference, so the upside looks very large today.

The market is pricing that gap as if it were permanent. The premium reflects supply that cannot be sold into China's market, a government paying above market for non-China material, and a scarcity that new separation capacity is designed to erode.

The politics matter too. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress, and a Democratic Congress will likely increase oversight of federal equity deals, while signed deals are expected to stand. The offtake is signed, so the floors are probably safe in the near term. The oversight will fall on the SPV's future decisions and its use of public money.

The 70% upside depends on a reference that is set to fall

The 70% share is tied to non-China reference prices. Those prices are high now because supply outside China is thin and the US is paying to keep it that way. As new separation capacity comes online, the non-China reference for dysprosium and terbium should compress toward Chinese levels once the initial supply panic fades. When that happens, the 70% share of the excess shrinks toward nothing, and the floor becomes the binding price rather than the ceiling.

At that point the put is exercised. The loss lands on the SPV's books, which means the US government and, ultimately, the taxpayer. USA Rare Earth's equity is exposed to the reference-price side, so its shareholders absorb any shortfall in the upside they were counting on. The floor protects the company's revenue from below only while the government keeps funding the buyer.

Every Western rare earth developer now has a template: a government-funded buyer, a fixed minimum, and upside on a non-China reference. I expect at least two more Western developers to sign government-backed offtakes with explicit floors modelled on this deal within 12 to 24 months. I also expect the US government to hold the downside on at least one of them before 2029.

My specific calls: USA Rare Earth reaches its roughly 4,000 tpa TREO run rate by Q2 2027, as targeted. It misses the roughly 6,400 tpa target by year-end 2027, because Stage 2 commissioning is scheduled for Q3 2027 and any slip compresses the window. The 70% upside share proves less valuable than the market assumes, because the non-China reference declines as separation capacity grows. The winners are Serra Verde's Brazilian operation and the US strategic stockpile. The losers are USA Rare Earth equity holders who priced the floor as a free option, and any Western magnet maker that assumed the floors would lower its input costs. The floors set a non-China price above Chinese levels, so magnet makers absorb that premium as a cost rather than receiving it as a subsidy.

What would prove me wrong: a sustained rise in non-China heavy rare earth supply that holds reference prices well above the floors for several years, or a Chinese move to lift licensing that reprices the entire market before 2029.

What the floor does to shareholders, the Pentagon's book and magnet makers

For USA Rare Earth's shareholders, the equity is now levered to a reference price the company does not control and the government underwrites. The 10.8% jump priced the floor as a gift. The structure moves the downside to the SPV and leaves the equity exposed to the reference side.

For the Pentagon and the taxpayer, the SPV is now a standing buyer of last resort. The first time a floor binds, the loss lands on the government's book, not the company's.

For Western magnet makers, the floors do not cut input costs. They hold a non-China price above Chinese levels, so the premium is a cost they carry. For Brazil, the Pela Ema operation and the Goiás region have become a strategic asset in a way they were not a year ago, reinforced by the federal government's early-November designation of rare earths as a high-priority critical mineral. For other Western developers, the template is live, and the race to sign before the political window narrows has started.

The shipments are real, and the put is still unpriced

The shipments are real. The payments are real. The Stage 1 milestone, completed on time and on budget, is real. None of that resolves the question the deal poses. The floors are a policy price, and the first test of the model will arrive well before 2029, when the non-China reference for dysprosium and terbium compresses and someone has to decide who holds the floor.

The Pentagon wrote the put, the taxpayer is the counterparty, and the market is still pricing it as a free option.